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INTRODUCTION
Privatization of correctional institutions has emerged in re-
sponse to the growing problem of prison overcrowding and the in-
creasing cost of providing correctional services.1 Although it offers
solutions to pressing social and financial problems, privatization
raises two significant legal questions. First, how much force may a
prison guard, hired by a private corrections corporation, use
against a prisoner; and second, who will be liable when that guard
uses excessive force?2
This Note analyzes the issues surrounding the liability of both
state and private corrections corporations for the excessive use of
force by private prison guards. Part II examines the imposition of
Section 1983 liability on private actors through the state action
doctrine. Part III addresses the constitutional limitations on the
use of force against incarcerated individuals, focusing on three is-
sues that affect the liability of state and corporate officials: the ba-
sis for supervisory liability, the availability of immunity defenses,
and the ability of a state to delegate its responsibility for prisoner
safety. Part IV examines the United States Supreme Court's prohi-
bition of federal adjudication of pendant state law claims against
state officials. Part V examines the liability of state officials and
corporate managers for excessive use of force by private prison em-
ployees and suggests a rationale for treating private corrections
corporations similarly to state corrections agencies. Finally, Part
VI concludes that the viability of private prisons may depend on a
determination that a private entity which is a substitute for the
1. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT TO HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, at 2 (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT].
2. Id. at 4.
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state with respect to liability should also stand in the state's shoes
with respect to common law immunity.
II. STATE ACTION: A PREREQUISITE FOR SECTION 1983 LIABILITY
A. State Action Analysis
The eighth and fourteenth amendments3 provide constitu-
tional protection for inmates against excessive use of force by the
state. Any constitutional limitation on the amount of force that a
private prison employee may inflict on a prisoner, therefore, must
be based on a finding that the private corporation's action is "state
action" under the Constitution.5 Once state action is established,
an inmate may sue a private corporation under 42 United States
Code Section 1983,6 which establishes a private right of action
against those who violate constitutionally secured rights. Courts
have recognized four theories under which private action may be
deemed state action. A discussion of each of these theories follows.
1. Public Function Theory
The Supreme Court formulated the public function theory in
Marsh v. Alabama7, which concerned an appeal by a Jehovah's
Witness of a criminal trespass conviction for distributing religious
literature in the business district of a company-owned town.8 The
Court, reasoning that town administration traditionally is carried
out by local government, held that the corporation had assumed a
public function. The privately governed town, therefore, could not
interfere with the constitutional freedoms of expression and reli-
gion of its citizens.9
Marsh stands for the proposition that a privately controlled
3. The eighth amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment, and
the fourteenth amendment guarantees them due process of law. U.S. CONST. amends. VIII,
XIV. See infra notes 59-124 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (involving inmate protection under
the eighth amendment), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974 (1977); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028
(2d Cir.) (involving inmate protection under the fourteenth amendment), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1033 (1973).
5. Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
6. U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). For a discussion of the historical context from which § 1983
arose, see Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv.
1323 (1952). For the text of § 1983, see infra note 61.
7. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
8. Id. at 502.
9. Id. at 506-09.
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city must afford its inhabitants the same constitutional protections
that a traditional municipality must afford to its citizens. In Amal-
gamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza Inc.10 the
Court extended the public function test to shopping centers. Logan
Valley concerned an appeal by labor picketers who had been en-
joined from picketing on the shopping center's sidewalk and park-
ing lot to protest the practices of a store in the shopping center.1"
The Court held that because the shopping center had supplanted
the municipally-maintained business block on which protests oth-
erwise would have occurred, the shopping center owner could not
prohibit members of the public from exercising those constitu-
tional rights that were directly related to the proper purpose of the
center.'2
The Court later overruled Logan Valley, but held to its posi-
tion in Marsh.'3 In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner 4 antiwar protestors who
had been handing out leaflets in a shopping mall appealed a tres-
pass conviction.'5 The Court purported to distinguish Logan Val-
ley on the basis that the protest in Lloyd was not directly related
to the activity of the shopping center.' In Hudgens v. NLRB17 the
Court recognized the weakness of this distinction. Under facts sim-
ilar to those in Logan Valley, Hudgens held that a shopping center
could not be equated with a municipality because the shopping
center did not effectively displace the municipality in a significant
number of its traditional functions.' 8 The Hudgens opinion also
stated that Lloyd had implicitly overruled Logan Valley.'9 The
public function test as applied in Lloyd and Hudgens limits a find-
ing of state action to situations in which the private actor performs
all, or almost all, of the functions of the traditional governing en-
10. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
11. Id. at 311-12.
12. Id. at 315.
13. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972).
14. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
15. Id. at 556.
16. Id. at 562-63. The Court noted that in Logan Valley the labor dispute between the
picketers and a tenant of the shopping center was related to the "proper purpose" of the
center. In Lloyd, the Court found no such relationship between the antiwar protestors and
the purpose of the center. Id.
17. 424 U.S. at 507.
18. Id. at 520-21.
19. Id. at 518-21. The Lloyd Court explicitly stated that it was not overruling Logan
Valley. 407 U.S. at 561-67. The Lloyd dissent, however, recognized the full implication of
the majority's holding. Id. at 581 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tity to the aggrieved party.2 0
2. State-Created Monopoly Theory
Proponents of the state-created monopoly theory argue that
holders of state-created or state-protected monopoly power should
be subject to the same constitutional restraints as the state.2' Once
a court establishes that monopoly action is equivalent to state ac-
tion, these proponents argue, the prohibitions of the fourteenth
amendment apply, and a cause of action under Section 1983 is
available.
The Supreme Court greeted the state-created monopoly the-
ory with hostility. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis22 a private club
refused to serve a member's black guest. The guest argued that the
state, by its licensing power, had created a monopoly over those
who could sell liquor.2 3 The Court denied that the state had cre-
ated a monopoly and held that the Liquor Control Board's regula-
tory involvement did not implicate the state in the policies of the
club to an extent that warranted a finding of state action.24 In
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.25 a customer asserted that the
termination of her electric service by a utility company that en-
joyed state-created monopoly protection constituted state action.26
The Court disagreed and noted that the challenged activity, in this
case and in Moose Lodge, was insufficiently related to the monop-
oly powers of the private entity. The Court remarked that it
would have been more amenable to finding state action if the chal-
lenged activity had been a traditional state function.2 s
20. See Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 568-69; see also Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 519. Professor McCoy
asserts that although the majority in Hudgens suggests that Marsh stands for the proposi-
tion that a private enterprise must assume all of the attributes of the state, the more rea-
sonable conclusion from these cases is that the shopping centers "had not sufficiently dis-
placed the traditional municipally controlled alternative forums for communications."
McCoy, Current State Action Theories, the Jackson Nexus Requirement, and Employee
Discharges by Semi-Public and State-Aided Institutions, 31 VAND. L. REV. 785, 800 (1978).
21. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
22. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
23. Id. at 177.
24. Id.
25. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
26. Id. at 347-48.
27. Id. at 358-59. At least one commentator found this explanation unsatisfactory, not-
ing that in both Jackson and Moose Lodge the private entities possessed state-protected
control only over the challenged aspect of their businesses. See McCoy, supra note 20, at
807.




The Supreme Court developed another strand of state action
analysis in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.29 In Burton
a private restaurant that leased space in a state-owned parking ga-
rage refused to serve a black customer. The customer claimed that
the restaurant's refusal to serve him violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.30 The Court determined that
the relationship between the state and the restaurant was "symbi-
otic"31  and characterized by "economic interdependence.
'32
Neither the state-owned garage nor the privately-owned restaurant
could exist without the other. Because the state had placed itself
in a position of economic interdependence with the restaurant, the
Court found that the actions of the restaurant constituted state
action.33
Although subsequent cases have advocated the Burton symbi-
osis theory, the Court generally has distinguished rather than fol-
lowed Burton.3 4 These distinctions have led to speculation on the
vitality of the symbiosis principle. The factual settings presented
by the subsequent cases have involved a regulatory state agency
and a regulated private party, rather than instances of true eco-
nomic interdependence as in Burton. The Burton theory has been
criticized for providing judges with too much discretion in deciding
what facts will establish a symbiotic relationship between a private
entity and the state.3 5
4. State Aid/State Regulation Theory
Cases in which individuals have asserted that the activities of
private entities amounted to state action because the state sub-
stantially regulated or funded the activities generally have been
unsuccessful. 6 In Blum v. Yaretsky3 7 a group of Medicaid patients
alleged that a private nursing home violated their fourteenth
amendment due process rights by changing their Medicaid classifi-
29. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
30. Id. at 716.
31. Id. at 725.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. McCoy, supra note 20, at 808-09.
35. Id. at 808-09 & n.98.
36. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982).
37. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
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cation and reducing their benefits accordingly.38 The Court re-
jected the state action argument, noting that it would characterize
private decisions as state action only if the state provided "signifi-
cant encouragement" or exercised "coercive power" over the pri-
vate entity.3 9 The Court implied that state action existed only in
cases in which the service provided was one traditionally provided
by the state; conversely, providing services that the state ordinarily
would not provide would not constitute state action even though
the entities were heavily subsidized and regulated by the state. 0
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn"1 the Court held that a private
school was not acting as the state in discharging certain employees
even though the school was the recipient of state funds and subject
to state regulation.42 The Court noted that although the state
heavily regulated the school, the state imposed few regulations on
the school employees.4 3 The decision implies that certain activities
of private entities constitute state action with respect to the in-
tended beneficiaries of state aid or regulation but not with respect
to those who are not intended beneficiaries.
44
B. State Action Analysis Applied to Private Detention Entities
Plaintiffs have successfully applied traditional state action
analyses in two Section 1983 actions alleging excessive use of force
by employees of private detention entities. 45 In Milonas v. Wil-
liams4 16 the Tenth Circuit decided that a private entity which in-
flicts excessive force on its charges acts as the state. Students at-
tending a private school for troubled youths brought a Section
38. Id. at 993-98. The Medicaid patients were reclassified and subsequently trans-
ferred from skilled nursing facilities to less expensive facilities. The patients argued that the
reclassification process denied them procedural due process. Id.
39. Id. at 1004. The Court did not define any standard against which to measure "sig-
nificant encouragement" or "coercive power." Id.
40. Id. at 1004-05. This implication is reminiscent of the public function theory, al-
though the Court did not cite Marsh or its progeny. Id.
41. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
42. Id. at 841-42. The discharged employee alleged violations of free speech and proce-
dural due process. Id.
43. Id. at 834, 836.
44. McCoy, supra note 20, at 823. The concept of the "intended beneficiary" or the
"individual impacted by the state action" is useful in explaining the sometimes seemingly
inconsistent holdings in state action cases. Under the intended beneficiary concept, a school
would be acting as the state with respect to students who were intended beneficiaries of
state aid, but not in relation to employees who were not. Id.
45. Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069
(1983); Medina v. O'Neill, 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
46. 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
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1983 class action against the owners and operators of the school,
alleging that the school's personnel used excessive force in viola-
tion of the first and fourteenth amendments. 7 Using the symbiosis
theory developed in Burton, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
private school's owners and operators were engaged in state action
because the state had "so insinuated itself" with the school that it
should be considered a "joint participant" in the offensive action.4 8
The court considered the facts that the state had drawn up de-
tailed contracts, significantly funded tuition, and heavily regulated
the educational program at the school to be determinative. 49 Ac-
cording to the Court, these facts demonstrated a sufficient nexus
between the state's involvement in the school and the conduct of
the school officials to support a Section 1983 claim.5
The second case in which plaintiffs successfully applied state
action analysis to the actions of a private detention entity is Me-
dina v. O'Neill,5 in which a group of illegal aliens brought a fifth
amendment due process claim alleging that conditions at the facili-
ties in which they were detained by a private security firm violated
their constitutional rights.2 The court found state action on the
part of both the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
and the private security facility which detained the illegal aliens on
behalf of the INS. 3 The district court applied the public function
test and noted that when the state delegates power traditionally
reserved exclusively for itself, the recipient of that power necessa-
rily engages in state action. 54 The court then analyzed the powers
47. Id. The former students brought the class action suit for injunctive relief as well as
for money damages, alleging excessive use of force, use of a polygraph machine, censoring of
student mail, and other practices that they deemed objectionable. Id.
48. Id. at 940, citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); see
supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
49. Milonas, 691 F.2d at 940.
50. Id. The court rejected the school's reliance on Rendell-Baker, asserting that a sim-
ilar school in that case was held not to be acting "under color of state law." Pointing to
dicta in Rendell-Baker that suggest that the students would have had a stronger state ac-
tion argument than the employee plaintiffs, the court declined to follow the Rendell-Baker
holding. The court also noted the following facts in favor of a state action finding: (1) some
of the students were involuntarily placed in the school by state officials; and (2) the state
officials were aware of and approved the practices under attack. Id.
51. 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984). The aliens complained that the detention
center kept 16 aliens in a room with only six beds and provided no opportunity for recrea-
tion. The aliens also complained that an escape attempt resulted in the accidental killing of
one alien by a private guard. Id. at 1031-32 & n.7.
52. Id. at 1030-33.
53. Id. at 1038.
54. Id.
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at issue to determine whether they were traditionally reserved ex-
clusively to the state.55 The court implied that the congressional
delegation of the power of alien detention to the INS indicated
that detention was a traditional governmental function. 5
Although Milonas and Medina are not the ultimate authority
on the issue of state action by private detention entities, their
analysis and conclusions are consistent with the state action theo-
ries adopted by the Supreme Court and followed by the lower
courts .5  Thus, courts should have little difficulty finding that the
actions of a private prison employee constitute state action.58 After
finding state action, a court must determine whether the conduct
of the employee violated constitutional norms, which is addressed
in the next section of this Note.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST
PRISONERS
A. Historical Background
A prisoner does not relinquish all constitutional rights upon
entering a correctional institution, but maintains those rights that
can be exercised consistently with his imprisonment.5 9 A prisoner's
rights include the fourteenth amendment rights to due process and
equal protection and the eighth amendment right to be free of
cruel and unusual punishment.60 Because constitutional rights are
not self-enforcing, Congress enacted Section 198361 creating a pri-
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 284-91 and accompanying text.
59. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); see also Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704
F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1983). In Sampley, the court remarked:
When sentenced to a prison term, an inmate loses the portion of his liberty interest
that is inconsistent with imprisonment. In particular, he loses his liberty interest in
being free from his jailer's use of force that appears reasonably necessary to maintain
or restore discipline. However, the prisoner does not surrender his constitutional rights
that can be exercised consistently with his imprisonment. This includes the portion of
his pre-existing liberty interest to be free from arbitrary, unnecessary violence perpe-
trated by state officials.
Id. at 495 n.6 (citations omitted).
60. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that a state statute making
drug addiction a crime violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
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vate right of action for violation of those rights.6 2
A prisoner can bring a Section 1983 claim for excessive use of
force under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment or
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amend-
ment.63 The drafters designed the eighth amendment to prohibit
torture and other barbaric methods of punishment."' The Supreme
Court has expanded the scope of the amendment's protection to
include grossly unfair punishment.6 5 At least one lower court has
stated that the eighth amendment guarantees "broad and idealistic
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency."66
Prisoners may invoke the fourteenth amendment due process
clause when the facts of their case do not conform to the eighth
amendment framework as in one Second Circuit case which held
that the eighth amendment applied only to incarcerated individu-
als and not to pretrial detainees.
6 7
B. Standards Concerning the Use of Force
1. Legal Background
In Johnson v. Glick the Second Circuit set forth a standard
for determining whether the use of force against an inmate violates
the prisoner's constitutional rights.6 8 Although the court ultimately
decided Johnson on fourteenth amendment grounds,6 9 other cir-
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or any
proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
62. See Note, Applying thd Eighth Amendment to the Use of Force Against Prison
Inmates, 60 B.U.L. REv. 332, 340 (1980).
63. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding that deliberate indiffer-
ence by prison personnel to prisoner's serious illness or injury a contravention of eighth
amendment), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974 (1977); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.)
(applying fourteenth amendment due process analysis to partially successful claim alleging
excessive use of force by prison guard), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). Many claims
brought under § 1983 alleged violations of both the fourteenth and the eighth amendments.
See, e.g., McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1986) (brutality by a prison guard, if
true as alleged, states a § 1983 claim under both the fourteenth amendment due process and
the eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment clauses).
64. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102. Early eighth amendment cases applied the amendment to
various methods of execution. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
65. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (holding that 15 years of hard labor
was excessive punishment for the crime of falsifying a public document).
66. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).
67. Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1032-33.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1032-33.
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cuits have adopted the Johnson standard in determining eighth
amendment claims. 70 The court set forth the following factors to
determine whether force against inmates had crossed the constitu-
tional line: the need for application of the force; the relationship
between the need and the extent of force used; the extent of the
resulting injury; and whether the motive behind the force was
based on a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or on
a malicious desire to cause harm.7
1
The court emphasized that not every use of force which seems
unnecessary in retrospect is a constitutional violation.72 The John-
son court pointed out that the constitutional protection against the
excessive use of force cannot be as extensive as the common law
torts of assault and battery 3 because prison guards must deal with
large numbers of uncooperative men and women in an environ-
ment that might require the use of intentional force.74
The Johnson test often is used in conjunction with other stan-
dards.7 " The Supreme Court set forth one of these standards three
years after Johnson in Gregg v. Georgia.76 The plaintiff in Gregg
alleged that imposition of the death penalty under the Georgia
death penalty statute7 7 constituted cruel and unusual punishment
70. See, e.g., Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1983) (applying the John-
son factors in an eighth amendment context in conjunction with another standard); Shil-
lingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1981) (using Johnson factors as the focus of
inquiry to determine whether the use of force violated the eighth amendment and gave rise
to a cause of action under § 1983); Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1980) (quoting
the Johnson test as a basis for reversing summary judgment in an eighth amendment-based
§ 1983 claim); Martinez v. Rosado, 614 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting the Johnson test in
reversing a grant of summary judgment for failure to state claim under § 1983 and the
eighth amendment); Meredith v. Arizona, 523 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting Johnson
factors in reversing dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1983 and the eighth
amendment).
71. Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033.
72. Id.
73. Id. "[T]he common law tort action for battery . . . makes actionable any inten-
tional and unpermitted contact with the plaintiff's person or anything attached to it. . ....
Id., citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 9 (4th ed. 1971). "[T]he common
law tort action for assault. . . redressfes] '[a]ny act of such a nature as to excite an appre-
hensive of battery.'" Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033, quoting W. PROSSER, supra, § 10, at 38.
74. Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033.
75. See, e.g., Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1984).
76. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
77. Id. The Georgia statute was amended following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), in which the Court held that statutes extending broad discretion to juries to impose
or withhold the death penalty violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The statute
as amended after Furman allows the death penalty in six categories of crime: murder, kid-
napping for ransom or where the victim is harmed, armed robbery, rape, treason, and air-
craft hijacking. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-63 (plurality opinion).
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under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 78 The Court stated
that a penalty should not be excessive but rather should be in "ac-
cord with 'the dignity of man.' ,,7 The court set forth two criteria
for determining excessiveness. First, the punishment must involve
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."' 0 Second, the punish-
ment must be out of all proportion to the severity of the crime. 1
The first Gregg criterion has been applied to Section 1983
claims brought against prison personnel.2  In Sampley v.
Ruettgers3 the Tenth Circuit held that the use of force by a prison
guard against an inmate violated the eighth amendment only if it
involved "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. '84 The
court read Gregg to require that the guards intend to harm the
inmate, that the force appear to be more than reasonably necessary
at the time, and that the attack result in either severe pain or last-
ing injury.85 The Sampley court cited the Johnson factors as
guidelines for applying the Gregg criteria.86 The court based its
narrow reading of Gregg on a recognition that prison guards often
must make quick decisions regarding the use of force and should
not be required to second guess the court.87
The Tenth Circuit again combined the Gregg and Johnson
tests in El'Amin v. Pearce,8 8 in which the court determined
whether retaliatory beatings by corrections personnel and a subse-
quent denial of medical treatment constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.8 The court applied the Johnson and Gregg criteria to
that part of the eighth amendment claim which alleged a beating
by prison personnel and held that the prisoner had stated a claim
under Section 1983.90 The court applied a different stan-
78. Id. at 162.
79. Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
80. Id. (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 392-93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
81. Id. (citing dictum in Trop, 356 U.S. at 100).
82. See, e.g., El'Amin v. Pearce, 750 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1984); Sampley v. Ruettgers,
704 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1983); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979).
83. 704 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1983).
84. Id. at 495 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (plurality opinion)).
85. Sampley, 704 F.2d at 495.
86. Id. at 495-96.
87. Id. at 496.
88. 750 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1984).
89. Id. The plaintiff alleged that he was beaten in retaliation for filing a complaint
against the prison chaplain's staff. He brought a § 1983 action claiming that both the beat-
ing and the subsequent denial of medical treatment constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Id. at 830.
90. Id. at 831-32.
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dard-established in Estelle v. Gamble9 -to that part of the claim
alleging a subsequent denial of medical treatment.92 In Estelle an
inmate in a Texas prison alleged that the prison staff provided him
with inadequate medical care after he had injured himself unload-
ing a bale of cotton.93 The Supreme Court held that "deliberate
indifference" to the serious medical needs of prisoners violated the
eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.9' Applying the Estelle standard, the El'Amin court found
that the failure by the prison's medical personnel to order an x-ray
did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.95 Thus, the
prison personnel's conduct did not establish a constitutional
claim.9 6
The Supreme Court twice has rejected the proposition that
negligence alone can support a Section 1983 claim.97 In Davidson v.
Cannongs an inmate alleged that prison officials negligently failed
to protect him from the violent actions of another inmate. The in-
mate sensed that he was in danger and sent a note to a high-level
prison official asking for protection. The official sent the note to
the "corrections sergeant." Although informed of the nature of the
note's request, the sergeant neither read the message nor acted
upon its contents. The court held that when a government official
is merely negligent in causing an injury, no procedure for compen-
sation is constitutionally required.9 9 In Daniels v. Williams'"0 an
inmate in a Richmond, Virginia jail slipped on a pillow negligently
left on a stairway by a deputy. The Court refused to allow a Sec-
tion 1983 suit and again declined to allow negligence to trigger a
constitutionally based cause of action.1 1
91. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
92. El'Amin, 750 F.2d at 832.
93. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
94. Id.
95. El'Amin, 750 F.2d at 832-33.
96. Id.
97. Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 668
(1986). The Court decided Daniels and Davidson on the same day.
98. 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
99. Id. at 670. Justices Brennan and Blackmun filed separate dissents. Justice Bren-
nan suggested that recklessness could support a § 1983 claim under the fourteenth amend-
ment and that the complaint alleged facts sufficient to support a finding of recklessness. Id.
at 671. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that negligence in some cases
could constitute a deprivation of liberty under the fourteenth amendment and thus could
support a § 1983 claim. Id. at 671-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
101. Id. at 663-67. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment. He reconciled his
position in Daniels with his Davidson dissent by distinguishing the facts in the two cases:
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2. Current Standard: Whitley v. Albers
In Whitley v. Albers'012 the Supreme Court considered a Sec-
tion 1983 claim brought against prison officials by an inmate alleg-
ing violations of his eighth and fourteenth amendment rights.
10 3
The inmate sustained serious injury to his leg from a shot fired by
a prison guard during the implementation of a plan by officials to
restore security during a riot.10 4 The Court held that the shooting
violated neither the eighth nor the fourteenth amendment.
10 5
In Whitley the Court recognized the need to apply different
standards to different kinds of eighth amendment claims. 08 The
Court refused to apply the "deliberate indifference" standard
adopted in the medical negligence context'07 and established a
standard for use in the context of prison disturbances. The Court
held that in order to establish an eighth amendment violation, a
plaintiff generally must show unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.108 The Court determined that in a prison disturbance setting,
the question of whether the action taken inflicted unnecessary pain
depends on whether the actor applied the force in a good faith ef-
fort to restore discipline or for the "very purpose of causing
harm."' 09 The Court set forth five factors relevant to the determi-
"[I]t is one thing to hold that a commonplace slip and fall. . . does not rise to the dignified
level of a constitutional violation. It is a somewhat different thing to say that negligence
that permits anticipated inmate violence. . . does not implicate the Constitution's guaran-
tee of due process." Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 671 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
102. 106 S. Ct. 1078 (1986).
103. Id. The inmate, Albers, was injured during a disturbance in Block A of the Ore-
gon State Penitentiary. Some prisoners in that cellblock had become agitated about per-
ceived mistreatment of other inmates by prison guards. Because of the general agitation, the
guards ordered the inmates into their cells early. One inmate became particularly upset and
assaulted one or two of the guards attempting to enforce this order. Id.
104. Id. After one assaulted guard escaped, another guard was taken hostage, but
some helpful prisoners eventually moved him to a safer area. The prison authorities discov-
ered the guard's predicament, and Whitley, the assistant prison superintendent, made sev-
eral unsuccessful attempts to reason with the belligerent inmate. Prison officials developed a
plan to invade the cellblock with an armed squad after falsely being informed that one
prisoner had been killed and that other deaths would follow. Albers and other inmates were
injured during the subsequent rescue effort. Id. at 1081-82.
105. Id. at 1087-88.
106. Id. at 1084. The Court observed that constitutional standards should "be applied
with due regard for differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment
objection is lodged." Id.
107. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); supra notes 91-94 and accompanying
text.
108. Whitley, 106 S. Ct. at 1084. The Court also noted, however, that a plaintiff may
prevail without a showing of an express intent to inflict unnecessary pain. Id.
109. Id. at 1085. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
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nation of this question: the need for the use of force; 10 the rela-
tionship between that need and the force actually used; " ' the ex-
tent of the injury inflicted;" 2 the extent of the threat to the safety
of prison personnel and other inmates;" 3 and efforts made to
lessen the severity of the use of force." 4 The Court was careful to
note that not every infliction of pain that in retrospect appears un-
necessary constitutes a constitutional violation." 5
Applying these principles to the facts of Whitley, the Court
concluded that the prison officials had a "plausible basis" for their
belief that the extent of force used was necessary under the cir-
cumstances."' Thus, the basic rescue plan did not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. 117 Turning to the question of the shoot-
ing itself, the Court noted that the inmate's burden of showing
that the shooting constituted an eighth amendment violation was
extremely heavy." 8 The Court concluded that the instant circum-
stances indicated that the shooting was an integral part of a good
faith effort to restore prison security and did not violate the in-
mate's eighth amendment rights. 119
With regard to the inmate's fourteenth amendment claim, the
Court found that the circumstances of the case did not entitle him
to additional procedural due process. 120 The Court did find, how-
ever, that the inmate raised a valid substantive due process
claim.12 After consideration of this claim as an alternative basis
for affirmance, the Court held that the eighth amendment is di-
414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
110. Id. at 1085. The Court borrowed this factor and the next two factors from John-
son, 481 F.2d at 1033.




115. Id. at 1084.
116. Id. at 1086.
117. Id. at 1087. The Court explained that "[a]n expert's after-the-fact opinion that
danger was not 'imminent' in no way establishes that there was no danger, or that a conclu-
sion by the officers that it was imminent would have been wholly unreasonable." Id. at 1086
(emphasis in original).
118. Id. at 1087.
119. Id. at 1087-88.
120. Id. at 1088. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's ruling that the state
was not obliged to afford the inmate "some kind of hearing either before or after he was
shot." Id.; see Albers v. Whitley, 546 F. Supp. 726, 732 n.1 (D. Or. 1082), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 743 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985), rev'd, 475 U.S.
312 (1986).
121. Whitley, 106 S. Ct. at 1088.
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rected specifically to the protection of prisoners.'22 The eighth
amendment, the Court concluded, provides the primary source of
prisoners' substantive protection in cases alleging the excessive use
of force.12 3 In such cases, therefore, the general language of the
fourteenth amendment can provide no greater protection than the
specific language of the eighth amendment. 24
C. The Use of Force and Entity and Supervisor Liability
The state action doctrine2 5 and Section 1983 combine to give
an inmate a powerful weapon against the private prison guard who
crosses the line between reasonable and excessive use of force. Lia-
bility, however, does not always stop at the subordinate level.
Managers, and sometimes the corporation itself, may be directly
liable to an inmate for damages caused by a subordinate. Courts
have been hostile so far to the imposition of derivative liability
under a respondeat superior theory.'26
Entity and supervisor liability are not automatic. Targets of
liability may avail themselves of immunity defenses based either
on the eleventh amendment 27 or the common law. 28 This Part
discusses the theories under which an inmate may sue a manager
or a corporation and the immunity defenses available to those
targets.
1. Theoretical Bases of Entity and Supervisor Liability
a. Entity Liability
Courts generally have refused to impose Section 1983 liability
on employers on the basis of the respondeat superior doctrine. 129
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103, 106).
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 5-58 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 167-200 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 201-47 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)
(holding that a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory); Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Reed v.
Slakan, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985) (holding prison supervisors liable for § 1983 violation under a
theory of direct liability, but not under respondeat superior); Pearl v. Dobbs, 649 F.2d 608
(8th Cir. 1981) (affirming the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim under
§ 1983 because the doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply); Johnson, 481 F.2d at
1034 (following the Second Circuit rule "that when monetary damages are sought under
§ 1983, the general doctrine of respondeat superior does not suffice and a showing of some
personal responsibility of the defendant is required").
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In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services130 the
Supreme Court held that a municipality could not be liable in a
Section 1983 action on the basis of respondeat superior alone.
13
1
The Court found that Section 1983's language-"any person
who. . .shall subject or cause to be subjected, any person. . .to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution of the United States shall be liable
thereto] " 32-imposed liability only when the person actually ef-
fects the deprivation or causes another to do so.1"' The Court in-
terpreted the causation language to mean that Congress did not
intend Section 1983 liability to attach when causation was ab-
sent. 13 4 The Court further inferred that creation of a federal re-
spondeat superior doctrine could be unconstitutional. 135
Although a municipality may not be liable under the respon-
deat superior theory, an employer may be liable if the injury oc-
curs during the execution of policies or customs. In Monell female
employees of New York City's Department of Social Services and
the Board of Education brought suit under Section 1983 for dam-
ages caused by official policies of the Department and the Board
forcing pregnant women to take unpaid leaves before they were
medically required to quit working. 38 The Court held the city lia-
ble, stating that when the execution of a government's policy in-
flicts injury and that policy is the "moving force" behind a consti-
tutional violation, the government is responsible under Section
1983.37 The Court elaborated on this standard seven years later in
Each of the cases concerned public defendants. If the cases concerned private defend-
ants and if state action were present, then the rational of these cases ostensibly would apply
to private actors.
130. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
131. Id. at 691.
132. Id. at 691-92 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (emphasis added)).
133. Id. at 692.
134. Id. The Court supported this construction of the statute with legislative history,
citing congressional rejection of the Sherman Amendment, which would have imposed a
type of vicarious liability on municipalities. Although noting that the legislative history was
inconclusive as to legislative intent, the Court determined that the Sherman Amendment
was the only form of vicarious liability presented to the legislature. Its rejection, together
with the absence of any language in the statute creating respondeat superior liability, cre-
ated a strong inference that Congress did not intend to impose this type of liability. Id. at
692 n.57.
135. Id. at 693-94. The Court noted that Congress indicated that a federally-imposed
affirmative obligation on local governments would be unconstitutional. Id.
136. Id. at 660-61 & n.2.




In Graham the Commissioner of the Kentucky State Police
was directly involved in a warrantless raid on the house of the fa-
ther of a murder suspect. The police ransacked the house and bru-
tally beat its inhabitants, who eventually sued the Commissioner
"individually and as Commissioner of the Bureau of State Po-
lice.' 13 9 The defendant settled, and the district court awarded at-
torney's fees 140 against the Commonwealth of Kentucky.' 4 ' The
Sixth Circuit affirmed the award. 142 The Supreme Court reversed,
distinguishing between official and personal capacity suits against
public officials.4 3 A suit in one's official capacity, the Court held, is
essentially a suit against the entity represented by the individ-
ual.'" Section 1983 liability in this type of suit must be predicated
on a policy or custom of that entity which signifies that the entity
was the "moving force" behind the constitutional deprivation. 45 A
personal-capacity suit 46 is one brought against the official's own
assets and requires that while acting under color of state law the
official caused a citizen to be deprived of a constitutional right.
4 7
Thus, Graham and Monell stand for the proposition that a plain-
tiff cannot maintain a suit under Section 1983 against a defendant
in the defendant's official capacity unless the entity represented by
the defendant was the moving force behind the violation.
b. Supervisor Liability
Supervisory or management-level employees may be liable for
injuries caused by their subordinates under several theories. First,
if a supervisor directly contributes to a violation of an inmate's
constitutional rights, he will be liable to the person whose rights
were violated.148 Second, a supervisor may be liable if he sets in
motion certain procedures that improperly deprive an inmate of a
138. 473 U.S. 159 (1985).
139. Id. at 162.
140. Section 1988 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides that a court may
award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a § 1983 action. 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982).
141. Graham, 473 U.S. at 163.
142. Graham v. Wilson, 742 F.2d 1455 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub noma. Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985).
143. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-68.
144. Id. at 165 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55).
145. Id. at 166 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
146. This also is referred to as an "individual-capacity" action. Id. at 165 n.10.
147. Id. at 166; see Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1978).
148. See Johnson, 588 F.2d at 744.
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property interest. In Johnson v. Duffy14e a prisoner whose honor
camp wages' 50 were taken away sued the sheriff in charge of ad-
ministering the county jail facilities. The inmate claimed that the
county authorities did not follow certain procedures that were pre-
requisites under state law to a forfeiture of honor camp wages. In
California, a transfer from a honor camp to a jail results in the
forfeiture of accumulated wages. 15' State law charges a county
committee with determining whether a prisoner ought to be trans-
ferred. 52 The plaintiff in Johnson claimed, and the defendant con-
ceded, that the committee never met. Thus, the plaintiff argued,
the transfer violated his right not to be deprived of property with-
out due process of law.153 The defendant sheriff was chairman of
the committee but had no input into the improperly made decision
to transfer the plaintiff.154 The Court noted that a showing of di-
rect participation in the deprivation of a right is not the only way
to demonstrate the causation requirement of Section 1983. A per-
son may be liable under that section if he "sets in motion a series
of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know
would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.'1 55 Thus, the
court found the sheriff liable.
Third, a supervisor may be liable to an inmate for a
subordinate's violations of the inmate's rights if the applicable
state law would make the supervisor liable in tort for the
subordinate's misconduct. In Hesselgesser v. Reilly' 6 a deputy de-
livered a prisoner's habeas corpus petition to the prosecutor in-
stead of the court. The prisoner remained in jail longer than he
would have if the deputy had delivered the petition correctly. The
sheriff had no knowledge of his deputy's actions. 157 The court held
that if state law provided for a sheriff's liability for the torts of his
deputies, then a prisoner could bring a Section 1983 action against
the sheriff for the deputy's violation of the prisoner's constitu-
149. Id.
150. Prisoners in honor camps earn wages of no more than $2.00 per day. The prisoner
in this case had accumulated $177.83 in wages at the time of forfeiture. Id. at 742.
151. Under California law, a prisoner may be transferred from an honor camp to a
prison if he refuses to work or to abide by camp rules. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4131 (West 1982).
152. Id.
153. Plaintiff's claim was based on a denial of procedural due process. 588 F.2d at 742.
154. The opinion does not state clearly who ordered the prisoner's transfer.
155. Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743-44.
156. 440 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1971).
157. Id. at 901-02.
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tional rights. 158 In this case, state law provided for exactly this
type of derivative liability.159 Thus, the sheriff was liable for the
constitutional violations of his deputy, even though the sheriff
himself did not violate the prisoner's right, did not cause them to
be violated, and was not negligent in preventing their violation.
16 0
A court also may impose liability on a supervisor who tacitly
authorizes constitutional abuses by his subordinates. In Slakan v.
Porter' guards in a North Carolina prison attacked a prisoner
with high-pressure water hoses and billy clubs after the prisoner
had slapped a guard through the bars of his cell. The prisoner sued
the guards and three of the prisoner's supervisors-the warden, the
secretary of corrections, and the director of prisons. The supervi-
sors' own testimony indicated that they knew of the practice of
hosing and bludgeoning prisoners for minor infractions.6 2 The
Fourth Circuit upheld a jury award of money damages against all
of the defendants. The court held that although a supervisor could
not be liable for the constitutional violations of his subordinates on
a respondeat superior theory, 6 ' he could be liable if supervisory
indifference or tacit authorization was a causative factor in the in-
jury.6 4 The court determined that an inmate must show first that
he faced a pervasive and unreasonable risk of harm, and second
that the supervisor's inaction amounted to deliberate indifference
or tacit authorization. 6 ' A prisoner may not make the second
158. Id. at 903. The Court based its holding on a broad interpretation of § 1988, the
companion statute of § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Section 1988 provides that when
principles of federal law are unable to furnish suitable remedies for violations of § 1983, and
certain other enumerated sections of Title 42, courts should apply principles of state law.
159. WASH. REv. CODE § 36.63.030 (1964).
160. The Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. New York City Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), seriously undermines the holding of Hesselgesser. Monell held
that a municipality may be sued when the execution of its policies by subordinates inflicts
constitutional injuries, but noted that the government's policies had to be the moving force
behind the violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-95; see supra notes 130-37 and accompanying
text. Monell retained a requirement of causation and expressly rejected the strict liability
theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 691. Hesselgesser, however, adopts a theory very close
to the theory rejected in Monell. Because Monell does not mention Hesselgesser specifically,
Hesselgesser perhaps retains some force.
161. 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984).
162. Id. at 371.
163. Id. at 372 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 658); see supra notes 130-37 and accompany-
ing text.
164. Slakan, 737 F.2d at 372; see also Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F.2d 83 (7th Cir.
1980)(holding that a police chief would be liable if he acted recklessly or knew of the danger
of plaintiffs being beaten by fellow inmates and failed to react reasonably).
165. Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373; see also Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929 (1981).
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showing by pointing to an isolated instance of brutality. A showing
that a supervisor did not act in the face of documented widespread
abuses will suffice.1 66
2. Constitutional and Common Law Immunities
The issue of immunity for defendants in a Section 1983 action
encompasses two distinct questions. First, whether state and cor-
porate defendants are eligible for sovereign immunity under the
eleventh amendment; and second, whether the defendants are eli-
gible for a qualified immunity based in the common law.
a. Legal Background of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The fundamental purpose for the eleventh amendment 67 is to
preserve the sovereignty that the states enjoyed before the adop-
tion of the Constitution. e" Although the amendment does not ex-
plicitly bar suits against a state by its own citizens, the Supreme
Court has held consistently that such suits brought in federal court
are barred unless the state consents to be sued.169 This jurisdic-
tional prohibition bars all suits brought against the state or any of
its agencies or departments regardless of the relief sought.170
The Supreme Court has extended the rule of sovereign state
immunity to preclude a suit for damages by a citizen in which the
state, although not named, is the real party in interest.17 ' A state is
166. Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373. The Court noted that liability may extend to the highest
official. The outer limits of liability "are determined ultimately by pinpointing the persons
in the decisionmaking chain whose deliberate indifference permitted the constitutional
abuses to continue unchecked." Id. The determination is one of fact. Id.; see also Avery v.
County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1981).
167. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI. The eleventh amendment provides that "[tihe judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
168. In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 661 n.9 (1974), the Supreme Court
concluded:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individ-
ual without its consent. This.. .is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the
Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plain of the [Con-
stitutional) convention, it will remain with the States....
(quoting Alexander Hamilton's Federalist Papers No. 81) (emphasis in original).
169. Id. at 662-63; see, e.g., Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279 (1973) (superseded by statute as stated in Carey v. White, 407 F. Supp. 121 (D.
Del. 1976)); Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Great N.
Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
170. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
171. Ford Motor Co. v. Indiana Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). This rule
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the real party in interest if the defendant is being sued in his offi-
cial capacity172 and, therefore, a prisoner ordinarily may not bring
an official-capacity action against a state employee. 17 3 Thus, plain-
tiffs may not avoid eleventh amendment immunity by suing state
officials instead of the state.' 4
In Ex parte Young 17 5 the Supreme Court held that the elev-
enth amendment does not bar an official-capacity suit for declara-
tory or injunctive relief. In that case the Court considered an ac-
tion to enjoin state officials from enforcing an unconstitutional
state statute. 7 6 The Court reasoned that the unconstitutional stat-
ute was void. Enforcement of a statute that the state had no au-
thority to enact stripped the individual of his official authority and
the sovereign immunity which he would otherwise enjoy. Thus,
the supreme authority of the federal government was preserved
without invading the sovereignty of the state.1 8
Application of the Young theory is limited to cases involving
prospective injunctive relief.17 9 In Edelman v. Jordan80 the Court
held that certain types of injunctive relief were barred because the
practical effect was too similar to a money judgment that would
ultimately be paid out of the state treasury.' 8' A class of benefi-
ciaries brought an action for injunctive and declaratory relief
against Illinois officials who administered the Aid to the Aged,
Blind, and Disabled (AABD) programs, jointly funded by the state
and federal governments. 8 2 The class alleged that the state offi-
cials violated the equal protection clause by following state regula-
tions that were not in compliance with the federal time limit for
processing applications and granting AABD aid.83 The Court de-
nied that portion of the claim which would require retrospective
protects the public funds of a state from being depleted by private lawsuit. See Great N.
Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 327
U.S. 573 (1946).
172. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985).
173. Id. at 165-66.
174. Id. at 170-71.
175. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
176. Id. The Court enjoined the Attorney General of Minnesota from bringing suit to
enforce a state statute which allegedly violated the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 168.
177. Id. at 160.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 666-71.
183. Id. at 653.
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payment of substantial funds out of the state treasury,18 4 distin-
guishing the injunctive relief requested in this case from the type
approved in Young.18 5 Under Young an injunction's impact on the
state treasury is a necessary result of future compliance with the
Court's decree.186 The relief requested in Edelman, however, re-
quired a form of compensation to those individuals whose applica-
tions were processed more slowly than required by federal law.1 s7
The Court concluded that the retrospective relief requested here
had a much greater resemblance to a monetary award against the
state than to the injunctive relief upheld in Young.'88 The Court
thus held that the eleventh amendment prohibited retrospective
injunctive relief.18 9
Prospective injunctive relief that approximates an award of
damages can fall within the structures of the eleventh amendment.
In Quern v. Jordan90 the Supreme Court resolved an issue that
arose out of the remand of the Edelman case. The Court remanded
Edelman to the district court, which ordered the defendants to is-
sue notices to individual class members informing them of their
wrongful denial of benefits.""' The court of appeals, sitting en
banc, reversed, but at the same time determined that a mere ex-
planatory notice advising applicants of the availability of a state
administrative procedure for determination of their eligibility for
past benefits would not be barred by the eleventh amendment. 92
184. Id. at 651.
185. Id. at 664, 677.
186. Id. at 657-68.
187. Id. at 668.
188. Id. at 665.
189. The Court noted:
It is not pretended that these payments are to come from the personal resources of
these appellants. Appellees expressly contemplate that they will, rather, involve sub-
stantial expenditures from the public funds of the state....
It is one thing to tell the [state official] that he must comply with the federal
standards for the future.... It is quite another thing to order [him] to use state funds
to make reparation for the past. The latter would appear to us to fall afoul of the
Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as
having any present force.
Id., quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 236-38 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
921 (1973).
190. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
191. Jordan v. Trainor, 405 F. Supp. 802, 809 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd, 551 F.2d 152 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 904 (1978), aff'd sub nom. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332
(1979).
192. Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332 (1979). The court of appeals reasoned that such a notice purported to decide
the issue of liability. Id. at 875.
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The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals. The Court
reasoned that this type of notice fell on the Young side of the elev-
enth amendment rather than on the Edelman side because state
agencies, not federal courts, would make the determination of eligi-
bility for past benefits.193
In Green v. Mansour'9 the Supreme Court refined the Quern
rule and held that "notice relief' is available only if it is ancillary
to an injunction." 5 In Green a plaintiff class brought an action
against the Director of the Michigan Department of Social Services
challenging state policies for determining eligibility for Aid to
Families with Dependant Children (AFDC) benefits.1 6 Congres-
sional changes in the applicable federal statute mooted the request
for an injunction, but the class continued to seek notice and de-
claratory relief.197 The Court refused to allow notice relief without
some other form of remedy, reasoning that because notice relief is
not the type of remedy designed to prevent ongoing violations of
federal law, the eleventh amendment prevents federal courts from
ordering it as an independent form of relief. 98 The Court also re-
fused to grant declaratory relief, reasoning that the usefulness of a
declaratory judgment would be primarily in rendering the issue of
liability res judicata in the state courts. 99 This effect would be
prohibited by the eleventh amendment because the declaratory
judgment would have much the same effect as a judgment for
money damages. 00
193. Quern, 440 U.S. at 347-48.
194. 106 S. Ct. 423 (1985).
195. Id. at 423.
196. Id. The plaintiff class alleged that Michigan's method of calculating earned in-
come under the AFDC program violated federal law. Michigan prohibited deductions for
child care costs and required inclusion of stepparent's income. These dual inclusions raised
a family's earned income, and thus lowered the amount the family received from the AFDC
program. While the complaint was pending, Congress amended certain provisions of the
AFDC laws to require states to implement dual inclusion programs. As a result the class's
request for an injunction became moot. See id. at 424-25.
197. Id. at 423.
198. Id. at 427.
199. Id. at 428.
200. Id.; see also Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943)
(holding that declaratory judgments unavailable to determine the constitutionality of state
taxes even though federal statutes specifically prohibited only injunctions); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (holding that declaratory judgments rendering a state criminal
statute unconstitutional unavailable if the declaratory judgment would have the same effect
as an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the statute).
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b. Legal Background of Common Law "Qualified Immunity"
Common law immunity is available to certain government offi-
cials for public policy reasons.20 1 Courts recognize two types of
common law immunity, qualified and absolute. Absolute immunity
protects an official from suit for any act done in the course of per-
forming his duties;20 2 qualified immunity protects him only from
those acts done in good faith.20 3 Police officers,204 legislators,20 5
20720ofiil thjudges,2 °0 governors, prosecutors, 2°s officials in the executive
branch of the state20 9 and federal governments, 210 and the Presi-
dent of the United States21 all enjoy some form of immunity from
tort suits at common law. Often this immunity extends to suits
based on violations of constitutional rights brought under Section
1983.
The Supreme Court first considered the application of com-
mon-law immunities to Section 1983 cases in Tenney v.
Brandhove.1 2 In Tenney the plaintiff alleged that members of a
state legislative committee had conspired to deprive him of his
constitutional rights by calling him before the committee in order
to intimidate him into silence.21 3 The court upheld the district
court's dismissal of the complaint, reasoning that Congress in en-
acting the civil rights law could not have intended silently to abro-
gate the long-standing tradition of legislative immunity.214 The
Court stressed that legislators enjoy absolute immunity for acts
done pursuant to office and noted that an allegation of "unworthy
201. These reasons include: (1) the injustice of holding an officer liable who is charged
by law to exercise discretion; and (2) the danger that the threat of liability would damper
the officer's desire to perform his duties zealously. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240
(1974).
202. See, e.g., Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896) (dismissing a
claim against a public prosecutor on immunity grounds even though the claim alleged
malice).
203. See, e.g., Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 245 (noting that the common law never granted
police officers immunity for acts done in bad faith).
204. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
205. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
206. See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
207. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
208. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
209. See, e.g., Scheuer, 416 U.S. 232.
210. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
211. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
212. 341 U.S. 367 (1951). When Tenney was decided, § 1983 was codified as 48 U.S.C.
§ 43. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 369.
213. Id. at 371.
214. Id. at 376.
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purpose" does not destroy the privilege.215 Legislators, the Court
reasoned, should not be subject to the hazard of a jury award
based on "speculation as to motives. "216
Officials in the executive branches of the state and federal gov-
ernments do not enjoy the absolute immunity of legislators. In
Scheuer v. Rhodes217 the Supreme Court considered a claim of im-
munity by officers in the executive branch of state government.
The Court refused to uphold the district court's automatic finding
of immunity and remanded the case for a determination of the
scope of the officials' discretion, the responsibility of their offices,
and the circumstances surrounding the violation.218 The Court rea-
soned that the more discretion and responsibility an official has,
the more sympathetic a court should be to a claim of immunity. If
the defendant demonstrates that the defense should be available,
he still must prove that he acted in good faith. 19
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald2 0 the Court considered an issue simi-
lar to the one presented in Scheuer. In Harlow, however, the de-
fendants were officials in the executive branch of the federal gov-
ernment. The Court noted that executive officials should be
entitled to absolute immunity only if their "special function or
constitutional status requires complete protection from suit."22
Thus, legislators,222 judges,223 prosecutors,224 and the President of
the United States225 enjoy absolute immunity. Most executive offi-
cials, however, enjoy only a qualified immunity.22 The Harlow
Court altered the good faith test enunciated in previous cases
227
and held that an executive official would be liable only if a plaintiff
could show that the official's conduct violated "clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
215. Id. at 377.
216. Id.
217. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
218. Id. at 248-50.
219. Id. at 247.
220. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
221. Id. at 807.
222. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), va-
cated sub noma. National Peace Action Coalition v. Committee on Internal Security, 517
F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
223. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
224. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), afi'd after remand, 633 F.2d
203 (2d Cir. 1980).
225. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 357 U.S. 731 (1982).
226. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).
227. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975).
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would have known. '228
Even though the facts in Harlow concerned federal officials,
the decision's language is broad enough to apply to state officials.
The Fourth Circuit has applied the Harlow rule to determine
whether several high-level state officials could avail themselves of
an immunity defense. In Slakan v. Porter2 29 a prisoner brought an
action against three guards and three high-ranking supervisory of-
ficials20 and alleged that the defendants used force against him in
violation of his eighth amendment rights.23' The guards allegedly
used high-pressure water hoses, billy clubs, and tear gas to subdue
the prisoner while he was confined in a one-man cell.232 The suit
against the supervisory officials alleged that the officials either had
been deliberately indifferent or had given "tacit authorization" for
such practices. 23 The evidence against the supervisory officials
showed that each was aware of seven prior incidents involving the
use of water hoses to subdue inmates in one-man cells;23 4 that they
had constitutional and statutory obligations to protect the prison-
ers from inhumane treatment;23 5 that the potential severity of inju-
ries that could be inflicted by the water was unpredictable;28 and
that the volatile prison environment necessitated clear guidelines
for personnel with direct responsibility for prison discipline.237 The
court rejected the supervisory officials' claim of qualified immu-
nity, noting that Harlow denies immunity when a defendant vio-
lates a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would
have been aware.2 8 The court emphasized that neither subjective
good faith nor lack of actual knowledge of their legal duties ab-
solved the state officials of Section 1983 liability.
39
The Supreme Court expressly has reserved the issue of
whether a private entity can enjoy a common law qualified immu-
nity.240 Circuit courts addressing the issue have split.241 Those
228. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
229. 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984).
230. Id. at 370. These officials included the prison warden, the director of prisons, and
the secretary of corrections. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 371.
233. Id.
234. Slakan, 737 F.2d at 371, 376.





240. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 942 n.23 (1982). In Lugar the
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courts allowing qualified immunity have done so primarily in cases
in which the party asserting the immunity has relied on the consti-
tutionality of a state attachment statute.242 In Jones v. Preuit &
Mauldin,24 the Eleventh Circuit relied on the common law defense
of good faith in an action for wrongful attachment and downplayed
the notion that a private entity could derive immunity from its
relationship with the state. Under Jones a defendant's immunity is
not technically an immunity at all; the defendant merely carries
over his common law good faith defense to a Section 1983 action.
Functionally, however, there is little difference between the quali-
fied immunity and good faith defenses.
The Jones court reasoned that defendants in Section 1983-
based wrongful attachment proceedings should not be penalized
for resorting to the courts to enforce rights which they in good
faith believed they possessed. 44 Courts that would deny immunity
to private entities have marshalled a variety of arguments in sup-
port of the denial of liability. One court argued that an extension
of immunity would eviscerate the already fragile protection af-
forded by Section 1983.245 The same court noted that private ac-
tors, unlike government officials, are not confronted with the need
Court made the following comments in response to its concern that private individuals, act-
ing under seemingly valid state laws, would be held responsible for their actions if a court
subsequently held those laws unconstitutional:
In our view. . ., this problem should be dealt with not by changing the character of
the cause of action but by establishing an affirmative defense. A similar concern is at
least partially responsible for the availability of a good-faith defense, or qualified im-
munity, to state officials. We need not reach the question of the availability of such a
defense to private individuals at this juncture.
Id.
241. Courts allowing the defense include the Eleventh Circuit, see Jones v. Preuit &
Mauldin, 808 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that qualified immunity is available to a
private entity that acts in good faith reliance on a statute that is not clearly unconstitu-
tional), the Eighth Circuit, see Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that
private defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if they neither knew nor reasonably
should have known that their actions violated clearly established constitutional rights), and
the Fifth Circuit, see Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that
a private party who attempts to secure rights under a presumptively valid statute may es-
tablish a qualified immunity from monetary damages).
Courts refusing to allow the defense include the Ninth Circuit, see Howerton v. Gabica,
708 F.2d 380 (1983) (holding that private defendants are not entitled to good faith immu-
nity under § 1983), and the First Circuit, see Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.) (hold-
ing that private parties acting in concert with state officials cannot avail themselves of a
qualified immunity defense), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
242. See Jones, 808 F.2d at 1440; Buller, 706 F.2d at 851.
243. 808 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1987).
244. Id. at 1440.
245. Downs, 574 F.2d at 15.
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to make split-second decisions without fear of liability.2 48 Another
court made the point that one rationale for giving state officials
immunity-to encourage competent people to accept public em-
ployment-does not carry over into the private sector.
2417
Related to the question of whether a private entity may enjoy
common law immunity is the question of whether the state may be
liable 248 for the constitutional violations of private prison employ-
ees. If a state cannot delegate its responsibility to care for its pris-
oners, then the state will be liable for the constitutional wrongs of
the private corrections personnel.249
Support for the proposition that a state has a nondelegable
duty to provide for the safety of prisoners lies in the nature of the
relationship between the prisoner and the state. An individual who
is incarcerated under state laws arguably is entitled to the state's
protection during the period of his incarceration. An expansive
reading of the eighth amendment might also lead to a finding of
non-delegability. Courts have suggested that states have an eighth
amendment obligation to protect prisoners from violence by other
inmates.25 0 The Supreme Court's willingness to apply the eighth
amendment standard to injuries inflicted by other inmates 251 sug-
gests that the states have an obligation to ensure prisoners' safety
that goes beyond responsibility for the actions of state officials.
252
How far this obligation extends will not be clear until the issue has
been tested judicially.
IV. JURISDICTIONAL CONSTRAINTS: PROHIBITION OF FEDERAL
ADJUDICATION OF PENDANT STATE LAW CLAIMS
In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman253 the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a federal court
could adjudicate a pendant state law claim to determine if the con-
246. Id.
247. Jones, 808 F.2d at 1441; see also Downs, 574 F.2d at 15.
248. The State still may assert its sovereign immunity in state court and its eleventh
amendment immunity in federal court. The state's common law immunity may be limited
by a state tort claims acts specifically relinquishing such immunity.
249. See supra notes 3-6, 68-124 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., Streeter v. Hopper, 618 F.2d 1178, 1182 (5th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Sulli-
van, 553 F.2d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 1977); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194,
201 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
251. See Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
252. Id.
253. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
1987] 1011
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:983
duct of state officials complied with state law.254 The Court held
that adjudication of this type violated the eleventh amendment,
even if the only relief sought was injunctive.255 Pennhurst arose as
a class action256 suit for damages257 and injunctive relief on behalf
of residents and potential future residents of Pennhurst, a state
institution for the care of the mentally retarded.258 The named de-
fendants included the school and several of its officials, the state
department of public welfare and several of its officials, and cer-
tain county officials.2 59 The claim alleged that conditions at Pen-
nhurst violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments and spe-
cific federal and state statutes.
2 0
The district court found that conditions at the school261 vio-
lated the eighth and fourteenth amendments 262 and state26 3 and
federal264 statutes. Based on these findings, the court ordered that
the residents be removed from the school immediately and pro-
254. Id.
255. Id. at 106.
256. Id. at 92. The plaintiff class consisted of all past or potential future residents of
Pennhurst, the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens, and the United States. Id.
257. The district court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity
on the damage claim. Id. at 93 n.1.
258. Id. at 92.
259. Id.
260. Id. These statutes included the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1982) [hereinafter Rehabilitation Act]; the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 [hereinafter Bill of Rights]; and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1983-84) [hereinafter MHMR Act].
261. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa.
1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), prior
judgment af'd on remand, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). The dis-
trict court found that conditions at Pennhurst were dangerous to the residents because of
frequent physical abuse and drugging of residents by staff members. The court also found
that conditions were inadequate for habitation and that the "physical, intellectual and emo-
tional health of many Pennhurst residents had deteriorated." Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. at
1308-10.
262. Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. at 1314-22. The eighth amendment violation stemmed
from a right to freedom from harm. Fourteenth amendment violations included deprivation
of due process and equal protection. The district court found that plaintiffs had a right to
nondiscriminatory habilitation and that if a state "undertakes habilitation of a retarded
person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting consistent with that individual's
habilitative needs." Id. at 1319 (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 1322. The court noted that the facility violated the MHMR Act, see supra
note 260, because the residents had not been rendered "minimally adequate habilitation."
Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. at 1322.
264. Id. The federal statutory violation occurred under the Rehabilitation Act, see
supra note 260; Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. at 1323-24.
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vided with suitable alternate living arrangements. 2 5 The court also
appointed a special master with the power and responsibility to
plan and implement the order.266 On appeal, the Third Circuit af-
firmed.267 The appellate court, however, based its decision solely
on the state statute2 8 and did not address the federal questions.
The court rejected the defendant's assertion that the eleventh
amendment barred the federal court's consideration of this pen-
dant state law claim.
269
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's determi-
nation of the eleventh amendment issue and reversed.27 0 Focusing
on the need for the Young exception to insure state compliance
with federal law, the Court concluded that the rationale of Young
was inapplicable in a case alleging noncompliance with state law.2
Because of the absence of the need to vindicate federal rights and
insure state compliance with the supreme laws of the federal gov-
ernment,27 2 the Court held that adjudication of the pendant state
law claim violated the eleventh amendment.273
The Court also rejected the allegation that the state had
waived its sovereign immunity.27 4 While accepting the principle
that a state may consent to be sued,7 5 the Court required that
consent be expressed unequivocally by the state.27 6 The Court also
acknowledged that Congress had the power to abrogate a state's
265. Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. at 1326-28.
266. Id.
267. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en
bane).
268. Id.; see supra note 260.
269. Pennhurst, 612 F.2d at 96. The court reasoned that under Young, the eleventh
amendment did not bar federal injunctive relief against state officials based on federal
claims. Thus, the same result would follow in a suit based on a pendant state law claims.
For a discussion of Young, see supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
270. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
271. Id. at 106.
272. Id. at 105-06.
273. Id. at 106. The Court stated:
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent... when a plaintiff alleges
that a state official has violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the doc-
trine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal court's grant of relief against state
officials on the basis of state law, whether prospective or retrospective, does not vindi-
cate the supreme authority of federal law.
Id. (emphasis in original).
274. Id. at 103 n.12.
275. Id. at 99.
276. Id.; see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974). The Court consistently
has held that a state's waiver of immunity in its own courts does not constitute a waiver of
eleventh amendment immunity in federal court. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99 n.9.
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eleventh amendment immunity.2 7 Such abrogation, however, only
takes effect if Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to de-
stroy immunity.278 The Court pointed out that Quern279 specifically
held that Section 1983 does not implicitly override the state's elev-
enth amendment immunity.2 8 0 The Court, therefore, found no
waiver of the state's sovereign immunity, either by the state's ex-
press consent281 or by Congress' override.8 2
V. ANALYSIS OF LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE
BY PRIVATE PRISON EMPLOYEES
A. Liability of the Corporation and Its Management Personnel
An inmate can bring an excessive force claim against a private
prison corporation and its personnel as a tort claim in state court
or as a Section 1983 claim in federal court, possibly with a pendant
state tort claim. Although the level of force required to establish
liability for the tort claim is lower than for the constitutional
claim, there are significant reasons for not bringing a tort claim in
state court. These reasons include a perceived lack of sympathy for
the litigant in state court, immunity in state court of any state de-
fendants, and the possible res judicata effect of a state court tort
claim decision on a potential Section 1983 claim. 83
1. State Action
The threshold issue in a Section 1983 claim by private prison
inmates alleging excessive use of force by corporate employees is
whether that use of force can be characterized as state action.284
The first issue in establishing state action is whether the type of
activity in which a private entity engages is one that is normally
considered a "traditional" state function.2 85 In Medina v. O'Neill
86
a federal district court suggested that the detention of individuals
pursuant to state law is a traditional state function. Under the
277. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99; see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
278. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99; see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979).
279. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
280. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99; see Quern, 440 U.S. at 342.
281. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 103 n.12. At the time that Pennhurst was filed, Pennsyl-
vania consented to be sued only upon express authorization by the legislature. Id.
282. Id. at 103.
283. See supra notes 167-200 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 7-20 and accompanying text.
286. 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
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public function test of Marsh, this finding alone satisfies the state
action requirement. Lloyd and Hudgens, however, suggest that an
entity must take on all, or almost all, of the functions of the state.
Arguably, even though a private prison does not take on all of the
functions of the state with respect to the population as a whole, it
does take on all the functions of the state with respect to the
prisoners.
The state-created monopoly theory may apply to the private
prison corporation. Although historically reluctant to accept this
theory of state action, the Supreme Court has remarked that it will
be amenable to a finding of state action if the monopoly concerns
state delegation to a private entity of a traditionally sovereign
function.287 State delegation of the power of detention to a private
prison corporation is delegation to a private entity of a tradition-
ally sovereign power.
The symbiosis or joint participant theory set forth in Burton
also points to a finding of state action in the private prison con-
text. In Milonas2 8 the court extended the Burton theory to a pri-
vate school that contracted with the state to provide detention ser-
vices for troubled youths.2 "8 The similarities between a private
prison corporation and a private detention center are many. Like
the center in Milonas, a private prison would have a contract with
the state, would be paid by the state, and would be regulated by
the state.290 A court applying the Milonas standard could easily
find that the actions of a private prison constitute state action for
the purposes of Section 1983 liability. The Milonas court suggested
that the state aid/state regulation theory might have some valid-
ity.2 1 The Court did not discuss whether these factors would be
adequate to support a state action finding solely on the state aid/
state regulation theory.
A private prison corporation potentially meets each state ac-
tion test. A considered analysis leaves little room for anything but
a finding that the actions of a private prison constitute state ac-
tion. A prison corporation, therefore, should be required to act in
287. See supra notes 28, 54-56 and accompanying text. Although Medina involved a
statutory duty of a federal agency, the discussion regarding the delegated power was cast in
more general terms.
288. Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069
(1983); see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
290. Milonas, 691 F.2d 931; see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 290.
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conformity with the constitutional rights afforded prisoners in
state prisons.
2. Constitutional Standard
In Whitley v. Albers1 2 the Supreme Court established the
standard for determining whether force used by prison personnel
violates constitutional norms. The Whitley Court stated that when
prison personnel use force to quell a disturbance, whether that
force violates any constitutional right turns on the user's intent.9
Good faith efforts to preserve discipline do not trigger Section 1983
liability, but malicious and sadistic attacks on prisoners do.9 In
making a determination of liability, a court also should consider
the need for the application of force, the relationship between that
need and the force actually used, the extent of the complaining
prisoner's injuries, the extent of the threat that the disturbance
presented to the staff and the inmates, and efforts by prison offi-
cials to lessen the severity of the use of force.9 5 If a court deter-
mines that an official plan to use force did not violate the eighth
amendment, the prisoners must show that the actual exercise of
force by a guard pursuant to that plan violated the constitution.9
Whitley also held that the fourteenth amendment provided no
greater protection than the eighth amendment. Thus, if a prisoner
fails to prove his case under the cruel and unusual punishment
clause, he may not fall back on the due process clause. 97
A corporation and its officials will be liable only if they
"caused" the inmate to be deprived of his constitutional rights298
such as when the corporation's official policy was a "moving force"
behind the constitutional deprivation.299 Corporate managers will
be liable for excessive force used by subordinates if the managers
directly contribute to the prisoner's injury,300 set in motion a series
of events that will probably result in a deprivation of rights,3 0 1 are
derivatively liable under state law for the acts of their subordi-
292. 106 S. Ct. 1078 (1986).
293. Id. at 109; see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 293.
295. Whitley, 106 S. Ct. at 1085; see supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
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nates, 02 tacitly authorize the conduct which directly causes the
harm,303 or fail to perform legally required acts designed to prevent
constitutional abuses.
3 0 '
Neither a corporation nor its employees are entitled to elev-
enth amendment immunity.305 The applicability of qualified im-
munity to private actors is not as clear. In circuits that grant im-
munity, the standards are not identical. In the Eleventh Circuit a
defendant must show that he relied in good faith on a statute that
is not clearly unconstitutional.0 8 In the Eighth Circuit a defendant
must show that he neither knew nor should have known that his
actions violated clearly established constitutional rights.30 7 The
real uncertainty, however, lies in the circuits that do not usually
allow private immunity. In circuits that have categorically denied
an immunity defense to private actors, immunity may be available
in the private prison context. The reasons for denying immunity to
private actors generally are not as compelling in the private prison
context. Courts have pointed out that private actors should not be
able to assert immunity because an extension of immunity would
eviscerate the already fragile protection afforded prisoners by Sec-
tion 1983.308 If immunity were extended to the private prison sce-
nario, prisoners would have no less protection under Section 1983
than they enjoy now. Courts also have argued that immunity
should not be extended because only government officials need to
make split-second decisions without fear of liability.3 0 9 This asser-
tion, however, does not hold true in the context of a privately run
prison. Finally, courts have asserted that immunity should not be
extended because courts should not concern themselves with at-
tracting personnel to the private sector.3 10 Society is ill-served by a
rule that frightens talent away from private enterprise. When pri-
vate entities perform public functions, public policy mandates that
personnel employed by those entities not live in fear of Section
1983 liability.
302. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes and 167-74 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 241.
308. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.




Current law provides protection for the state from adjudica-
tion of Section 1983 claims for damages against the state in name
or as the real party in interest.311 Furthermore, Pennhurst 12 pro-
tects state officials from suit in federal court on pendant state tort
claims. State officials also have the limited immunity provided by
the qualified immunity doctrine. 13 Conversely, corporations have
no eleventh amendment protections and no protection under Pen-
nhurst. Corporations, therefore, are vulnerable to suit in federal
court for a Section 1983 claim based on their participation in
"state action." A suit stating a cause of action under Section 1983
and accompanied by a pendant state tort claim ultimately could be
decided on the basis of the much lower common law tort standard
unless legislative or judicial protection not presently in place is af-
forded the corporation. Currently, a corporation's only protection
against a state tort claim in federal court is the possibility that the
federal court will dismiss the state law question. In the state sys-
tem, a private prison inmate could bring his state tort claim in
state court and subject the corporation to common law tort liabil-
ity under a comparably lower standard than would be required for
a Section 1983 claim. State tort liability, however, could be limited
by affirmative state action through either the legislature or the
courts.
B. Liability of the State and Its Officials
A private prison inmate cannot bring a suit for damages
against the state either in state or federal court31 unless the state
consents to be sued 15 or Congress expressly overrides the state's
immunity.31  Thus, the primary issue with regard to the state is
whether its officials can be held liable for the acts of the corporate
guard in a Section 1983 action on a direct liability theory. The an-
swer to this question depends partially on whether the state has a
nondelegable duty to protect prisoners. Although the nature of the
state-prisoner relationship and the broad dictates of the eighth
amendment arguably mandate a finding of nondelegability, 317 the
311. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 253-82 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 201-09 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 169, 274-76 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
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question remains unresolved.
If the courts find that the state has a nondelegable responsi-
bility for the safety of prisoners, state officials will be subject to
suit under Section 1983 for excessive force by a corporate guard
according to the Whitley standard. The state itself could be sub-
ject to suit for injunctive relief if the constitutional deprivation oc-
curred because of the implementation of unconstitutional state
standards or policies.3 18 Relief in these cases would be limited to
prospective injunctive 19 or notice relief.320 If courts refuse to find a
duty to protect prisoners, the state officials' liability will arise only
from affirmative acts of those officials that directly cause the cor-
porate prison guard to violate an inmate's right to be free of cruel
and unusual punishment.
3 21
C. A Proposal for Restrictions on Private Prison Liability
The entrance of private corporations into the field of prison
management has led to serious consideration of legal methods by
which a prison corporation might limit its liability. Exposure to the
common law liability for the torts of assault and battery,3 22 requir-
ing only intentional and unpermitted contact or an apprehension
of battery, would make nearly impossible the management of a
prison, where discipline is critical to both the successful day-to-day
operations and the safety of the prison population and staff.3 23
One solution to this problem lies in the restructuring of liabil-
ity through contract provisions with the state. These contracts
should provide that the state remains liable for all claims against
the corporation resulting from corporate actions taken pursuant to
state law or policy. The state would be in no worse position under
this type of contract than if it ran the prison directly. The corpora-
tion would be able to defend itself against inmates' claims by argu-
318. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
323. See Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033. The court in Johnson made the following obser-
vation regarding the management of prisoners:
The management by a few guards of large numbers of prisoners, not usually the most
gentle or tractable of men and women, may require and justify the occasional use a
degree of intentional force. Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unneces-




ing that the state is the real party in interest32' and that unless the
state consented to suit,325 the claim is barred both in state and
federal courts. Contractual provisions for other less justifiable
types of conduct by corporate employees and managers would be
subject to public policy restraints and state reluctance to accept
blanket responsibility for the corporate actions.
Deputizing corporate officials in order to give them the legal
protections of the state3 26 is another possible solution to the liabil-
ity problem. This alternative would provide the corporation with
the state's particular immunities from liability. However, both the
interest of the corporation in maintaining its independence and the
interest of the state in an arm's length relationship with its service
providers may discourage the adoption of this solution.
A third alternative involves state and federal legislative action
setting forth the express contours of state and corporate liability
under the common law and Section 1983. Legislative delineation of
legal duties could provide guidelines for determining which persons
or entities will be liable and under what standards liability will be
adjudged. Finally, a fourth possible solution to the prison corpora-
tion's exposure to unlimited liability could be brought about by a
Supreme Court decision favoring qualified immunity for private
entities that take on a high-risk traditional state function such as
prison management.
VI. CONCLUSION
The private prison corporation's exposure to liability for the
use of force against prison inmates is greater than the exposure of
the state itself, even though both are engaged in the same prison
management activity and deal with the same potentially volatile
situations. The private prison corporation, though engaged in state
action when it manages prisons, is not regarded as the state for
purposes of eleventh amendment immunity. In addition, the cor-
poration may not be able to assert a qualified immunity defense,
which would protect the corporate management from liability for
discretionary decisions made pursuant to established state policy
or statute.
The exposure of the corporation to the low standards required
in common law tort suits for assault and battery would seriously
324. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 167-239 and accompanying text.
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undermine the authority of the prison corporation to use force
when necessary to maintain or restore discipline. This authority is
essential not only for management of prison disturbances, but also
for the successful daily maintenance of a disciplined prison
environment.
Some state legislatures will likely determine that private pris-
ons are an acceptable solution to the problems in state prisons. If
private prisons are to remain viable, however, courts and legisla-
tors must provide liability protection beyond that which the pre-
sent law affords. Failure to do so may result in exposure to sub-
stantial liability, a serious disincentive to the proliferation of
private correctional facilities.
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